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Abstract 
Resettlement of displaced communities both developments induced and disaster induced has 
been a subject widely discussed for the last three decades. Among them this study reviews the 
experience of Siribopura resettlement housing program in Hambantota Sri Lanka, a city 
which has witnessed a number of evictions and resettlements during the past half a decade. 
Accordingly this article presents the findings of factors that contributed to the success and 
failures of the resettlement housing programs implemented in Hambantota during the period 
of 2004–2011. Autonomy of designing own houses, appropriate counseling and facilitating 
the resettlers to adapt to new environments, proper linkage of socio cultural aspects with real 
estate and economic aspects and availability of formal property rights are presented as crucial 
factors for the success of the resettlement in the case materials provided within this study. It 
is expected that the lessons learned from this research may provide a systematic feedback that 
can be utilized to increase effectiveness of planning and operation of resettlement programs 
in other emerging cities in Sri Lanka.  
 
Keywords:  Resettlement, Success and failure factors  
 
Introduction 
Around the world millions of people are being displaced due to various development projects, 
natural disasters etc (William, 1989). As stated by Kumarasiri (2009), during the last twenty 
years more than 20 million people worldwide have been compelled to move from their homes 
to make room for massive development projects. On the other hand, aftermath of lanina 2010, 
tsunami 2004 and 2011, millions of people have been displaced in countries like Australia, 
Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, Indonesia etc. including Sri Lanka. As a result “resettlement of these 
displaced communities” has been a subject widely discussed for the last three decades; 
centering around various impacts on re-settlers, with a particular focus on socio-economic 
hardships etc. As a matter of fact many studies of resettlement projects invariably highlight 
the sufferings of people that occur due to changes in their places of living and the livelihoods 
(Viratkapan et.al 2006). Although, from the perspective of displaced people, forced 
resettlement is always a disaster, the resettling agencies often assumed that the resettlement 
programs they design is often successful. Therefore it is important to reconcile these two 
extremes by learning from the past and correct the future, so as to minimize such negative 
effects being caused to the resettlers. Hence, this study aims to review the experiences of 
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“resettlement programs” in an emerging city like Hambantota, which has witnessed a number 
of evictions both development induced and disaster induced resettlements during the past half 
a decade. Accordingly this article presents the findings of a research study on the factors that 
contributed to the success and failures of the resettlement housing programs implemented in 
Hambantota during the period of 2004–2011. It is expected that the lessons learned from this 
research may provide a systematic feedback that can be utilized to increase effectiveness of 
planning and operation of resettlement programs in other emerging cities and towns in Sri 
Lanka.  
 
Identifying Resettlements  
Resettlement is a multisided opportunity for the reconstruction of systems of production and 
human settlements that represent a development in the standard of life of those affected, as 
well as in the regional economy of which they are a part. Therefore “resettlement”, must also 
be development oriented and planning must take into account that the social and physical 
infrastructure, school and health services, access to employment opportunities, and housing 
plot allotments and dwellings will meet expanded needs (Smith, 2001). And also as 
Macdonald et al, 2008 mentions; involuntary resettlement is commonly associated with the 
impoverishment of local communities, the destruction of their productive assets and the 
disruption of their social fabric. Such impoverishment risk may arise in terms of landlessness, 
joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and 
mortality, loss of access to common property and services and social disarticulation (Yuefang 
et al, 2003). Hence the primary objective of any induced involuntary resettlement process 
should be to prevent impoverishment and to reconstruct and improve the livelihood of 
resettlers. According to Asian Development Bank (1995) many development projects that 
require involuntary displacement of people generally have adverse economic, social, and 
environmental impacts on the displaced people. Hence three important elements should link 
with involuntary resettlement; compensation for lost assets and loss of livelihood and income, 
assistance for relocation including provision of relocation sites with appropriate facilities and 
services, and assistance for rehabilitation to achieve at least the same level of well-being with 
the project as without it.  
 
Scholarly Works Related to Factors Affecting on Success and Failures of Resettlement 
Housing Programs 
Smith (2001) based on a study conducted in Bingol Province in Turkey identified three 
factors, crucial in determining the success or failure of a resettlement project: the physical 
environment of the new settlement, the relationship to the old village and the capability of the 
community to develop itself. Smith also categorized these factors into four (based on the data 
from Middle East and Latin America) namely: site, layout, housing and popular input. 
Further discussing the uneven development performance of resettled villages in Turkey; 
Smith also suggested that the success or failure of a settlement should be judged by the extent 
to which the village has become self-reliant in its own right or a viable partner to its original 
village. They assess this condition on the basis of six factors: the number of houses still 
occupied; the modification of the form and internal layout of the provided housing; the 
degree of maintenance and state of repair; the development of gardens, tree planting and 
enclosures thereof; the extension of buildings and investment in them; and the construction of 
private buildings.  
 
Takesda et al (2008) stated that, resettlement schemes conducted in New Gediz, Turkey were 
successful due to the reason of "transfer of responsibility from settlement agencies to the 
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settlers themselves". According to Takesda, in the first place people were attracted to the new 
city by the provision of services which were not made available at old sites. In the second 
place, the availability of alternative forms of employment in clerical and service jobs as well 
as other opportunities in local coal mines and factories enabled displaced rural people to 
generate new patterns of production in a new environment that was distant from agricultural 
land. However, poor choices of site for resettlement were identified as one of the most 
frequently mentioned causes of resettlement failure. In addition, housing design and 
construction too were often blamed for the rejection or failure of post-disaster resettlement 
projects and the loss of privacy was another frequent complaint. Accordingly Takesada et al 
(2008), one point for success of resettlement project was the opportunities available for the 
future generations, particularly the educational opportunities for their children. To this end, 
those said resettlement programs had included the construction of new schools in the 
resettlement areas. He also noted that it has been sometimes easier and more feasible to 
provide the transportation necessary for the children of resettlers to go to existing nearby 
schools, rather than constructing new ones. As cited by Takeda, the Ikawa Village on the Oi 
River in central Japan, which was subject to relocation because of dam construction, provided 
a dormitory for the younger generation in a nearby city as it was impossible to commute to 
high school from their houses after resettlement. As a result, the village owned a dormitory in 
the big city, Shizuoka. It was constructed by tax revenues from the dam and power plant, in 
order to allow their children to stay in the city and go to school. When construction of Keban 
dam in Turkey, it was interesting to note that the project announced that those affected by the 
dam construction would be given a chance to go abroad to work.  This was one of the tricky 
points that used to persuade people and would help to success the resettlement project. In 
essence, a sound resettlement plan should include all families living in the project area, 
because self-resettlers also need to receive technical, administrative and socio-economic 
support. This is why counseling services should be provided in the departure area. This point 
is also very important from the angle of the environmental approach to resettlement, because 
unplanned self-resettlement carries the risk of environmental destruction in both rural and 
urban arrival areas (Antinbilek et al, 1999). 
 
A review of resettlement projects in Indonesia, during early 2000 following factors were 
commonly identified as reasons for failure of resettlement projects; lack of adequate baseline 
information, inadequate resettlement planning, lack of consultation and participation of the 
affected people, budgetary shortfalls for timely compensation payments, insufficient 
technical expertise and inadequate institutional capacity, weak monitoring program (Zaman, 
2002). However, in Mirpur resettlement project, Bangladesh had been extremely successful 
in terms of most aspects of the immediate development process in the resettlement estate. The 
factors that had contributed to its success were; the self-help housing model based on site-
and-services scheme that was successful in terms of providing a cost-effective means for 
providing a more secure and better living environment, location, infrastructure provision and 
security of tenure; good organizational structure that integrated government agencies, NGOs 
and the community - This implicitly denotes that the initial registration and allocation of plots 
was fair and transparent.  Sustainable livelihood improvements, with both increased incomes 
and a major growth in the assets owned by the Baunia residents were also accounted as the 
factors to be success (Soussan et al., 1999). Takesda 2008, considering the Kotmale Dam 
Construction induced resettlement project in, Sri Lanka, mentioned that the resettlers of the 
project had an opportunity to select whether they settle near to the previous location with less 
land plot or settle in newly develop Mahaweli areas with large land plots. However in 
Mahaweli area the settlers’ income was less stable unlike previous location. But they received 
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better social and physical infrastructure facilities. However, according to Takesda et al 
(2008), the resettlers settled Mahaweli area recorded more negative results than those who 
settled closer to the previous locations. Similarly as per the findings of the assessment made 
on Southern Highway Resettlement, Sri Lanka by Kurruppu et al (2005) state that “many 
displaced persons continued to stay in the same location even if this meant living in 
cramped”. Therefore these findings imply that the success of resettlement is not only 
depending on physical and economical improvements but also the social factors which play a 
significant role. 
 
As per the international advocacy; the World Bank and the ADB experience over the past 10-
14 years, major common factors identified that could contribute to the success of resettlement 
are: political commitment of borrowers in the form of laws, policies, and resources 
allocations; close adherent to established guidelines and procedures in implementation; sound 
social analysis, reliable demographic assessments and appropriate technical expertise in 
planning for development-oriented resettlement; reliable cost estimate and provision of 
required financing, with resettlement activities phased in tune with civil works construction; 
effective executing agencies that are responsive to local development needs, opportunities 
and constraints; people participation in setting resettlement objectives, identifying 
reestablishment solutions, and implementing them (World Bank 2004, ADB,2009).  
 
Siribopura Resettlement Housing Program  
Siribopura Resettlement Housing Program (Figure - 01) was developed to relocate the 
communities affected by Tsunami in Hambantota city in 2004 and communities displaced 
due to various development initiatives in Hambantota thereafter. Hambantota Divisional 
Secretarial (DS) Division was reported as one of highly affected Tsunami areas where almost 
30% of the Hambantota old town was washed away with main commercial area. Most of the 
affected households lived together with more than one family unit and did not have minimum 
requirements for living. As a result the Siribopura Housing Program was initially 
implemented to provide permanent residences for the displaced households due to Tsunami. 
Accordingly in 2005/2006, 1083 households were resettled in this settlement. Subsequently 
due to construction of phase I of Southern Harbour as a part and partial activity of the 
Hambantota Development Plan, 454 households were resettled (Source: Urban Development 
Authority).  
 
Resettlement Procedures: The Urban Development Authority (UDA) was the main 
responsible agency for the relocation of tsunami affected communities while several other 
government and non-government organizations gave their assistance accordingly. When 
considering the Tsunami reconstruction, UDA followed a ‘House to House’ policy and under 
the House to House rule, previous ownership of land was irrelevant to getting one’s, name on 
list to receive a house i.e. the policy was a house regardless of land tenure. The Divisional 
Secretary was to select these beneficiaries and resettlers have been chosen based on the 
criteria that (1) he/ she must be tsunami affected person, (2) property was situated within 100 
m from the sea and there is no alternative to live in safely. When there were few families in 
one home, each family was entitled to receive a separate house. Following above criterion 
each selected beneficiary family received a built up house
1
 with a 20 perch land.  
 
                                                          
1
  Houses were donated by several NGOs and CBOs namely Suchi Foundation, Sajith Foundation, Singapore 
Red Cross, Suboda Foundation, Care International etc. 
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Figure 01 – Case Study Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by Author 
 
 
Siribopura Resettlement Site 
Hambantota Town 
Hambantota Harbor 
With regard to harbour development induced resettlement implemented in 2007/2008 the 
Ports Authority was the executing agency in expropriating the displaced households while 
other line agencies provided the necessary services as required. Unlike Tsunami housing, all 
resettlers from harbor development received a 20 perches land with proportionate 
compensation for the loss of their original place.  Accordingly the resettlers had constructed 
their own houses based on their own layouts and designs. The payment of the compensation 
was carried out according to a special cabinet approval
2
, and as a result the owners could 
receive compensation over and above the market value of their properties (according to the 
interviews with resource persons of the Ports Authority and focus group discussions with 
resettlers, 2011). Also the unauthorized settlers of the original location too were able to 
receive compensation for the loss of their house. Accordingly the minimum compensation 
payment for a house was Rs 500,000, where some families could receive figures up to Rs 
2,000,000 (interview with the Ports Authority, 2011). Further if the owner vacated the land to 
the Authority without any delay the Authority had paid an extra 10% compensation in order 
to motivate the owners to physically vacate the lands for the project. In addition for those 
who originally were in the possession of more than one acre of agricultural lands received an 
agricultural land of 40 perches within 1Km proximity to Siribopura resettlement site. 
 
 
Study Methods: As implied earlier the aim of this study is to evaluate the Siribopura 
Resettlement Housing Program in terms of factors affected to the success and failures of the 
project. For the said purpose several variables that causes success or failures of resettlement 
were identified (Table 01) based on previous scholarly works (Sec 3) and interviews with 
                                                          
2
   Generally the compensation for resettlers will be paid under Land Acquisition Act No 09 of 1950 
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several Sri Lankan expertise
3
 who have considerable experience with regard to resettlement 
housing programs. Accordingly, before and after situation of resettlers were considered by 
data collected through questionnaire survey with 120 families of Siribopura Housing 
Program, including 100 families from Tsunami resettlement program and 20 families from 
Southern Harbor Development –Phase I, Resettlement Program. Table 02 describes the mean 
values derived based on the resettlers responses for the level of satisfaction, with regard to 
real estate, economical and social aspects using the above questionnaire survey. In addition, 
Table 03 has further summarized the existing situation of the facilities provided for the above 
resettlers in the selected sites. These data has been analysed descriptively together with the 
empirical evidences made through the reconnaissance survey in the project sites. 
 
Table 01 – Variables4 used to ascertain the success and failures of the Resettlement    
Program 
Main Criterion Variables used to measure the criterion 
Improvement of physical 
environment of the 
resettlement (Real Estate 
aspects) 
 Choice of site for resettlement 
 Provision of services to the new location 
 Layout of the property  
 Housing design, construction and privacy 
 Common property resources and community/ public services 
provided to affected persons. 
Full economic 
rehabilitation of the 
affected persons 
(Economic Aspects) 
 New pattern of employment opportunities and motivation for 
other financial  gain opportunities 
 Facilities to upgrade their present livelihood 
 Opportunities for future generation 
 Access to credit facilities 
 The capability of the community to develop itself 
Full social rehabilitation of 
the affected person (Social 
Aspects) 
 Social status and relationships 
 Commitment for family  
 Education opportunities and facilities for younger generation 
 Facilitating for religion practices 
 Political empowerment 
 Crime rate in the area 
 Counseling services provided  
Source: Compiled by Authors, 2011 
 
 
Results of the Research 
 
Snapshot of the respondents:  75.8% of the respondents of the questionnaire survey were 
Sinhala Buddhists while the next highest (21.7%) were Muslims, similar to the total 
population composition of the settlement. The average household size in the settlement was 
around 4.4 and 15% of families responded were female headed. 50.8% of families of the 
sample fall to an income (monthly) range between Rs 10,000 to Rs 25,000, where prior to 
resettlement it has been 39.2%. 40.8% of them fall between an income ranges of Rs1500 – 
10000 after resettlement. Prior to the resettlement this amounted to 48.3%. However the 
percentage of households that earn more than Rs 25,000 monthly has been dropped from 
                                                          
3
 Experts in agencies such as Disaster Mitigation Center, Urban Development Authority, Ports Authority, 
Divisional Secretariat Office and the  Local Authority 
4
 These variables are measured through a questionnaire measured in liquored scale which scaled as  
    5= strongly satisfied, 4 = satisfied, 3 = neutral, 2= disagree, 1= strongly disagree   
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12.5% to 8.3% (Primary Survey, 2011). Hence it shows that in general these households are 
falling in the category of poor to lower middle income group where significant improvement 
in income level after the resettlement has been marginal.  
 
Real Estate Aspects: When real estate aspects are considered, it shows that the level of 
satisfaction among the resettlers for the design and construction of resettled houses, physical 
infrastructure and other common services provided to the sites have been favorable for harbor 
resettlement with a mean value of 4.0 to 4.3. However the results for the Tsunami housing 
have been comparatively less favorable with a mean value of 3.4 and 2.3 respectively. As 
evident in Table 03 (criteria 01 and 02) on average more than 80% of the households receive 
the required essential physical and social infrastructure within 1-8 km proximity. However 
the reason for lower satisfaction with respect to the services for Tsunami housing was that 
there were certain Tsunami resettled houses that did not even have electricity yet. With 
respect to design and construction, the resettlers of harbor development project been 
receiving the financial compensation in order to build the house according to their wish and 
therefore the level of satisfaction for the design and construction of harbor resettlers houses 
were higher as 80% (mean value =4.0). Further all most all the houses both Tsunami and 
harbor were built in modern to semi modern state with permanent materials where some of 
the harbor resettled houses were even being two storey (Table 03: Criteria 04). Hence on 
average the factors such as design and construction of houses and the services provided to the 
sites have been successful in the Siribopura resettlement from resettlers’ point of view.  
 
When considering the factors such as site selection and layout and the improvement to the 
land tenure after resettlement are concerned, the level of success in terms of mean value, 
records 1.7 and 2.4 for Tsunami resettlement and 2.3 and 3.3 for the Southern Harbor 
resettlement respectively. Overall these factors record a mean value of 2.9 and 2.0 
respectively. Many households were dissatisfied with the location due to comparatively 
higher distance to the town area than previous location. Especially those were engaged in 
fishing and farming in Hambantota coastal line, now have to travel to the sea shore by bus or 
on foot for about 3.5km. Further in the case of Tsunami housing many households did not 
like the layout of the house with a kitchen in front. Many of them have made amendments to 
the initial layouts in reconstructing their kitchen and the toilet according to their wish. Also 
majority of the households only possess a verbal or written agreement (merely a letter from 
the donor) to prove their ownership to the respective property where the title to the property 
has not yet been formalized except in 196 out of 453 harbor resettled properties being 
receiving deeds.  
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Table 02 – Level of satisfaction of the households with regard to the physical, economical and 
social improvements they received after resettlement 
Source: Primary Survey, 2011 
 
 
Main 
Criterion 
Variables used to measure the 
criterion 
Sub Mean values Total  mean value 
Tsunami Harbor Overall Tsunam
i 
Harbor Over
all 
Improvement 
of physical 
environment 
of the 
resettlement  
Site selection and Layout of the 
property  
1.7 2.3 2.0 
2.7 3.5 3.1 
Improvement of land tenure 2.4 3.3 2.9 
Provision of services to the new 
location 
2.3 4.3 3.3 
Housing design, construction and 
privacy 
3.4 4.0 3.7 
Common property resources and 
community/ public services 
provided to affected persons 
3.3 3.4 3.4 
Full 
economic 
rehabilitation 
of the 
affected 
persons 
Facilities t  upgrade their present 
livelihood 
1.9 1.9 1.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8 2.8 2.8 
New pattern of employment 
opportunities, and motivation for 
other financial  gain opportunities 
2.9 3.0 2.9 
Opportunities for future 
generation 
3.2 3.2 3.2 
Access to credit facilities 3.0 3.1 3.1 
The capability of the community 
to develop itself 
2.8 2.9 2.9 
Full social 
rehabilitation 
of the 
affected 
person 
Social status and relationships 3.1 4 3.6 
 
2.5 2.9 2.7 
Avenues and time for  family 
commitments 
2.8 3.1 2.9 
Educational opportunities and 
facilities 
3.0 3.0 3.0 
Facilities for religion practices 2.8 3.2 2.9 
Political empowerment 2.6 2.8 2.8 
Crime rate in the area 2.9 3.0 2.9 
Counseling services provided in 
the departure area 
0.1 0.9 0.5 
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Table – 03 - Situational Analysis on Resettlements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteria 
 
Sub criteria 
 
Before Resettlement 
 
 
After resettlement 
Tsunami Harbor Tsunami Harbor 
01 Provision of services to the 
new location 
 Availability of Physical infrastructure (Electricity, water 
supply, telecommunication  ...etc) 
76% 83% 74% 84% 
 Availability of Social infrastructure (Schools, hospitals, 
administrate matters, play grounds etc.) 85% 100% 86% 100% 
 Average distance to schools 1.2km 1.9km 1.8km 8.4km 
 Average distance to hospital 2.4km 2.6km 5.3km 2.8km 
02 Common property resources 
and community/ public 
services provided to affected 
persons 
 Availability of Community Centers 77% 80% 51% 37% 
 Parks & Play ground 64% 60% 37% 50% 
 Average distance to admin matters 2.7km 2.5km 1km 0.5km 
 Percentage of respondents satisfied with the agency 
relationship in resettlement 
N/A N/A 79% 60% 
03 Improvement of land tenure 
 
 Type of Tenure Only 196 received 
deeds and others to be 
entitled for 
Government grants and 
Permits 
1. Encroached 32% 30% 
2. Freehold 5% 0% 
3. Government Grant 56% 70% 
 Proof of ownership 
1. Registered deed 43% 17% 4% 47% 
2. Unregistered deed 09% 10% - - 
3. Verbal and written agreement 6% 13% 92% 53% 
4. No idea 34% 17% 4% - 
 Planning approval 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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5
 Foundation Only 
6
 Partly completed 
7
 Fully complete 
04 Housing design, construction 
and privacy 
 
 No of Stories 
1. One Store 94% 100% 100% 75% 
2. Two Store 4% - - 25% 
3. More than two store 2% - - - 
 Design 
1. Modern 19% 30% 12% 50% 
2. Semi Modern 69% 63% 88% 47% 
3. Old 12% 07%  03% 
 Houses Constructed using permanent materials 82%  93% 100% 100% 
 Level of completion of house 
N/A N/A 
Built up 
houses were 
donate 
FO
5
 
7 
PC
6
 30 
FC
7
 63 
05 New pattern of employment 
opportunities and motivation 
for other financial  gain 
opportunities 
 Major occupation (s) of resettlers  
1. Fishing 06 13 16 4 
2. Farming 17 07 13 1 
         3. Self occupation 30 57 31 12 
         4. Executive and staff level jobs 77 63 73 20 
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 Activities attached to the land other than housing 
Fishing & Small 
industry 
(SM ) 
 
 
Farming 
& SM 
SM and 
businesses 
(BS) are 
engaged by 
limited no 
of settlers 
SM and 
BS are 
engaged 
by 
limited 
no of 
settlers 
06 Access to credit facilities  Number of households who had accessed to credit 
facilities 
15 20 26 46 
 Sources of credit Micro credit Micro  Micro  Micro        
   Credit Credit Credit 
      
  
 Availability of collateral 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 Eligible to receive assessment numbers from the local 
authority 0% 0% 0% 0% 
07 The capability of the 
community to develop itself 
 
 
 Services received from the local authority  
(Average respondents received the services such as 
garbage collection, drainage construction & maintenance, 
road construction and maintenance, street lighting etc) 
55% 4% 
Limited 
Services are 
provided 
Services 
are 
provided 
relativel
y higher 
than the 
tsunami 
housing 
 Households who made new investment on land N/A N/A 46% 39% 
Sri Lankan Journal of Real Estate 
Department of Estate Management and Valuation  
University of Sri Jayewardenepura  
Issue 06 - pp. 01-15  
12 
 
Source: Primary Survey, 2011 
                                                          
8
 These market evidences were obtained through focus group discussions with resettlers 
08  land market value (RS)  Formal market 
N/A N/A 
Not yet 
eligible 
No 
evidence 
of 
transacti
on 
 Informal market 
N/A N/A 
Initially 200000 -
300000 to 1.500,000 to 
1900,000 at present
8
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This includes the fact that none of these households have been eligible to apply for the 
planning approvals and the assessment numbers for their property and as a result these 
properties do not formally come under the preview of the respective local authority (Table 03 
– criteria 03). Further consequences of it is that the majority of the housing transactions have 
been carried out in the informal markets, which indicates that resettlers would not be able to 
realize the full capital value of the property (Table 03 – criteria 08). (Note: A comparison of 
land values in the informal and the formal market was not possible in absence of private lands 
in the surrounding area). 
 
Economic Aspects: When economic factors are considered Table 02 indicates that new 
pattern of employment opportunities and the motivation for other financial gains, 
opportunities for future generation and access to credit facilities have been successful in the 
eyes of the resettlers with a mean value greater than 3 (except the first factor which is slightly 
below 3.0 in tsunami housing). Analyzing these factors with Table 03 (criteria 05) shows that 
more than 75% of the resettlers were engaged in self employment activities and executive to 
staff level jobs which are new pattern of employment where the conventional livelihoods of 
Hambantota area being fishing, farming /agriculture. Only less than 25 % of the resettlers 
were engaged in fishing and farming activities. The main reason behind this change would 
have been the practical difficulties they have to face to continue their traditional livelihood 
activities and the declaration of Hambantota to be develop as a mega city and the 
development activities flourished to the surrounding area accordingly, including Southern 
Harbor, New Administrative Complex etc. where people have the motivation to hope for new 
aspirations of their lives in future irrespective of what they receive at present. Especially the 
harbor resettlers believe that they may get the priority for job opportunities in future in 
Southern Harbor. Further as the table 03 (Criteria 06) shows, a considerable number of 
households whom were in need of credit were able access for loan facilities through micro 
loan programs irrespective of the absence for collateral.  
 
However the income generating activities attached to the land (investment on land other than 
housing) has been dropped from 2.1 to 1.7 in Tsunami and Southern Harbor Resettlement 
when compared with the situation of before resettlement which was increased from 1.8 to 2.0. 
This was mainly due to the fact that the change of livelihood pattern and the lack of space 
available for homestead activities than previous. Moreover 30% of the Tsunami houses are 
being unoccupied (reconnaissance survey, 2011) even though those properties are being 
allocated for beneficiaries. Prior to 2009 this unoccupancy ratio has been around 50% (focus 
group discussion, 2011). Even though this unoccupancy ratio has come down, yet there is a 
considerable number of houses which are being unoccupied. In addition almost all the 
commercial properties inside the settlement are not functioning and are being closed and 
deteriorating. These circumstances, all together with the lack of formal rights to the land as 
mentioned earlier had lead to the negative results for the community’s ability to develop by 
themselves as shown in Table 2. (2.8 for Tsunami Resettlement and 2.9 for Southern Harbor 
Resettlement respectively). This means that still the community expects the dependency of 
the resettlement agency for their survival rather facing the contingencies by themselves.  
 
Success and failures in Social Aspects: In terms of social factors improvement of social 
status, educational opportunities and facilities have been successful with mean values 
recording higher than 3, where avenues and time for family commitment, facilities for 
religion practices, political empowerment and the reduction of crime rate in the area have 
been in the margin of neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (Table 02). Out of five (05) sites 
Sri Lankan Journal of Real Estate 
Department of Estate Management and Valuation  
University of Sri Jayewardenepura  
Issue 06 - pp. 01-15  
14 
 
allocated (in Tsunami housing) for Buddhist temples, four (04) Buddhist temples have been 
abandoned without clergies, as some of them are mere housing plots built for residences 
rather than specifically designed for temples. Hence the participation for rituals and 
ceremonial events of laymen’s by clergies has been not seen often.  However the temples 
build for harbor resettlement have been functioning relatively successful. Further Islamic 
mosques are comparatively well built with the participation of the Islamic community, where 
people are actively practicing their religious customs (Reconnaissance survey/focus group 
discussion, 2011). With respect to counseling services provided for the resettlers in order to 
uplift their mentality and guide them to rehabilitate themselves physically, economically and 
socially to the new environment, shows rather negative results (mean value =0.5). Some of 
the women in Tsunami houses show signs of fatigue and depression when their views are 
expressed. Moreover many of the resettlers were strongly dissatisfied with regard to such 
guidance provided by the resettling agencies irrespective of compensation and facilities 
provided to them. As per the focus group discussions held with selected resettlers (2011) 
during the field survey it was revealed that during the resettlement process, no program was 
conducted to upgrade the mentality of the resettlers, especially for Tsunami resettlers where 
they still struggle to restore their social life (for instance, some are having their second 
marriages and 15% of the samples were widows) after loss of their family members. On the 
other hand with respect to resettlers of Southern Harbor a considerable number of households 
had lost their money received through payment of compensation due to lack of knowledge in 
managing such finance thereby investing their money with the non reliable financial 
investments
9
.  In addition some of the households had not managed their financial 
compensation to restore their house to a livable stage. These factors are symptomised in 
Table 04 (criteria 4), where only 63 % have completed their housing construction and 7% of 
them had completed only up to the level of foundation and 30 % of them had partly 
completed their houses. With respect to crime rates the focus group discussions also revealed 
that some of the idling properties have been using for illegal activities such as prostitution 
and drug dealing (ganja) and if increased would have a serious social implication to the entire 
settlement. Further this resettlement locates in a place where there is no host community 
physically so that at a glance these settlements looks isolate from rest of the area until 
proposed developments to the surrounding area come up.  
 
Overall Satisfaction: The overall satisfaction of the Siribopura Tsunami Resettlement 
Program in terms of real estate, economic and social aspects shows a mean value of 2.6 
showing a success rate of about 50%. Among this rate of success economic aspects records 
the higher mean value of 2.8 in comparison with 2.7 for real estate and 2.5 for social aspects. 
However, comparatively the Siribopura Southern Harbor Resettlement Program (which was 
implemented 2-3 years after the Tsunami resettlement) shows a success rate of about 62% 
(overall mean value 3.06). The reason for this difference has been mainly arrived through 
satisfaction of the resettlers with respect to real estate aspects (total mean value of 3.5) while 
having a same level of satisfaction as Tsunami housing for economic aspects. However in 
both projects social factors records the lowest level of satisfaction with a mean value of 2.5 
and 2.9 for Tsunami and Harbour Resettlement Projects respectively.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Investing money with “Dhaduwam Mudalali” (Nick name of a man who established an illegal financial firm in 
Sri Lanka), who had been later accused for making fraudulent financial investments through public deposits 
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Concluding Remarks: The Lessons Learned 
It is a fact that resettlers are satisfied with their situation only if they are not merely displaced 
but rather resettled with development. Hence in strict sense of “resettlement” resettlers should 
be better off than before resettlement and should be sustainable overtime. When the outcomes 
of the Siribopura Resettlement Projects are concerned firstly it is envisaged that more the 
autonomy and resettlers participation in designing and arranging the layout of their houses 
are given, higher the rate of satisfaction would be, owing to the fact that within Sri Lankan 
context house is more a socio cultural estate than just a dwelling. Site selection naturally 
becomes a factor which unfolds dissatisfied for resettlers owing to the socio cultural 
relationship that the resettlers had with their previous location. This seems to be the case for 
almost all resettlement projects both locally and internationally. Moreover reinstate them 
fully to their previous socio cultural status may not be feasible, but what can be done in this 
regard is to facilitate them to adapt to the new environment with passage of time. For instance 
it was shown that Siribopura resettlers have adopted themselves to new type of jobs from 
their traditional livelihoods.  
 
Another aspect investigated was, whether the resettlement has reduced the existing poverty of 
resettlers. As per the findings of the study the income level of resettlers increased marginally 
and even one could argue that such increment is negligible when the time value of money 
since resettlement is concerned. One major corner stone that can be generally agree to cause 
this issue was the absence of formal title to the land to gain the optimal value and utilization 
thereby to invest on it with certainty. On the other hand explicitly it was shown that the 
absence of a suitable atmosphere to continue and improve their additional sources of income.   
 
Further providing appropriate counseling for resettlers is emphasized for the resettlement 
executing agencies, where this paper adequately pointed out how the absence of counseling 
for resettlers could agitate the said issues both short term and long run in the resettlement. As 
a matter of fact, in counseling the resettlers of the disaster induced and development induced 
should be treated separately. For instance the cause of the mental destruction of two groups of 
resettlers may vary; as there can be a startling difference where the Tsunami resettlers are 
more of a situation of a “dilemma” and harbor resettlers more feel like the losers of the 
development projects. 
 
Moreover the study clearly surfaces that the crucial socio-cultural aspects or values are 
insufficiently linked to the economic and real estate aspects which is fundament to the real 
sense and to the sustainability of the resettlement. Reinstate a damaged community is not 
merely limited to reconstruction of serviced houses and provide them a job. Hence the need 
for a consistent conceptual approach to social impacts should be emphasized.  If not the 
shortfall in one aspect generates negative consequences in multiple effects making the 
resettlement unsuccessful.  
 
In addition the absence of formal land rights and withholding and abandonment of properties 
(both residential and commercial being idling) have generated market failures. This in turn 
had been a barrier for respective local authorities to intervene formally with respect to land 
management of these properties. This includes that the community might envisage to weak 
political empowerment and institutional capacity hindering their capability to offset their risk, 
absorb shocks and meet contingencies, thereby causing inability for the community to 
develop by themselves.       
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